![]() These are different projects, nonetheless something is shared by both of Hume’s original definitions: they define causes locally. Others, like Pearl ( 2009), have remained stalwart regularity theorists. Lewis’s ( 1973) concern is that regularity theories developed on the basis of Hume’s first definition remain problematic, so he turns his attention to the second and the provision of a counterfactual theory of causation. ![]() –Hume, The Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, my emphasis Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed. Lewis pointed out that Hume defined causality twice, once by regularity and again by counterfactual dependence.Į may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second. Perhaps more extant accounts of causation are universal in this sense perhaps all are. However, both Pearl’s ( 2009) modern regularity account and Lewis’ ( 1973) counterfactual account of causation are universal. How this assumption should be interpreted of course depends on which account of causation we employ, since this determines how we define both the general causal relata types C and E and what it means to be “a cause”. (UA) If C is a cause of E, then C is a cause of E always and everywhere (at every space-time location V). Finally, I argue that a proper balance between universal and local causation can be assuaged by moving from presheaves to fully-fledged sheaf models. The paper presents this idea as stemming from an approach using presheaves as models of local truth. The use of presheaves as models of local variation has precedents in algebraic geometry, category theory and physics they are here used as models of local causal variation. I then report on the use of presheaves as models of local causation. I argue that local accounts of causation are plausible, and have pragmatic, empirical and theoretical advantages over universal accounts. The local account of causation presented here rejects this assumption, allowing for genuine variation in causation to be explained by differences in location. ![]() A hallmark of universal accounts of causation is the assumption that apparent variation in causation between locations must be explained by differences in background causal conditions, by features of the causal-nexus or causing-complex. I argue that these should be generalized to produce local accounts of causation. The counterfactual and regularity theories are universal accounts of causation.
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